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Abstract
We construct a price index with weights on the prices of di⁄erent PCE goods chosen to minimize
the welfare costs of nominal distortions: a cost-of-nominal-distortions index (CONDI). We compute
these weights in a multi-sector New-Keynesian model with time-dependent price setting, calibrated
using U.S. data on the dispersion of price stickiness and labor shares across sectors. We ￿nd that
the CONDI weights mostly depend on price stickiness and are less a⁄ected by the dispersion in
labor shares. Moreover, CONDI stabilization leads to negligible welfare losses compared to the
optimal policy and is better approximated by core rather than headline in￿ ation targeting. An even
better approximation of the CONDI can be obtained with an adjusted core index that covers total
expenditures excluding autos, clothing, energy, and food at home, but that includes food away from
home.
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11 Introduction
Core in￿ ation is at the center of many central banks￿e⁄orts to monitor and pursue price stability.
At the Federal Reserve, this focus is well re￿ ected by the inclusion of core PCE in￿ ation￿ the change
in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index ex food and energy￿ among the four
macroeconomic variables featured in the ￿Summary of Economic Projections￿published by the FOMC
four times a year.1
Intuitively, the rationale for focusing on core in￿ ation is that the prices of food and energy are among
the most volatile components of headline in￿ ation. Therefore, attempts to stabilize headline in￿ ation
in the face of shocks to non-core prices would require sharp movements in real activity. Moreover, this
increased real volatility might also result in an increase, rather than a reduction, in in￿ ation volatility,
if the shocks to non-core prices tend to dissipate faster than the time it takes monetary policy to a⁄ect
overall prices.2
This argument has been formally articulated in at least two ways. First, current core in￿ ation is a
better predictor of future headline in￿ ation than current headline in￿ ation itself. This is a statistical
statement of the idea that non core prices are ￿volatile.￿If this statistical statement is correct, central
banks running an explicit￿ or implicit￿ form of in￿ ation forecast targeting should pay close attention
to core in￿ ation as an indicator of future in￿ ationary pressures.3
The second argument in favor of focusing on core in￿ ation as a guide for monetary policy comes from
New Keynesian theory. In an economy in which prices change only infrequently, and do so at di⁄erent
rates for di⁄erent goods, the central bank should concentrate more on the stabilization of in￿ ation in
the goods with stickier prices, since it is in their production that the real distortions caused by price
dispersion are larger. This principle, originally proposed by Goodfriend and King (1997), was formalized
by Aoki (2001) in a two-good economy in which one good has perfectly ￿ exible prices. In this case,
the monetary authority should focus exclusively on stabilizing in￿ ation in the sticky price (core) good.
Benigno (2004) showed that a similar result holds in a multi-good case with an arbitrary distribution
of price stickiness across goods.4
1 The other variables are headline PCE in￿ ation, GDP growth and unemployment.
2 For an extremely clear statement of this reasoning from the perspective of a policymaker see Mishkin (2007)
3 This statistical underpinning for the role of core in￿ ation in policymaking has recently received much scrutiny in
the literature and in the policy debate (Blinder and Reis, 2005; Rich and Steindel, 2007; Crone et al., 2008; Kiley, 2008;
and Buiter, 2008). Earlier contributions include Bryan and Cecchetti (1994), Quah and Vahey (1995), Clark (2001), and
Cogley (2002).
4 Benigno (2004) casts his analysis in an international context, with many heterogenous Countries in a monetary union,
rather than many heterogenous sectors in a closed economy. The two interpretations of his analysis are formally identical,
2In practice, these theoretical results are usually interpreted as implying that central banks should
target core in￿ ation (e.g. Mishkin, 2007; Plosser, 2008), since the prices of non core goods tend to be
more ￿ exible than those of other goods and services.5
In this paper, we revisit quantitatively the theoretical argument in support of core in￿ ation targeting,
in light of the recent detailed microeconomic evidence on the frequency of price adjustment presented by
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008a, NS in what follows). We also study the robustness of this argument
to the presence of heterogeneity in labor shares across goods-producing sectors, another potentially
important source of asymmetric distortions, even when all sectors share the same degree of nominal
rigidity.6 Our analysis proceeds in three steps.
First, we construct a database with measures of price stickiness and labor shares across PCE cat-
egories, at two levels of aggregation. At the coarser level of aggregation, we only distinguish between
non-core goods, which include food and energy, and core goods, which include everything else. At the
￿ner level of aggregation, we consider ￿fteen ￿major types of products￿ , such as motor vehicles and
parts, food at home and away from home, housing, and medical care. We also consider the baseline case
of one homogeneous good. The construction of this database is one of the contributions of the paper,
since comprehensive measures of the degree of heterogeneity in the production of personal consumption
goods and in their price ￿ exibility were not previously available.
For price stickiness, our primary source is NS, whose data refer to the frequency of price adjustment
for the 270 entry level items (ELIs) in the non-shelter component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
This data covers about 70 percent of CPI expenditures, but it excludes entirely housing services (rent
and owner￿ s equivalent rent) and a large fraction of PCE medical care. To extend this partial evidence
on CPI items to cover all the ￿fteen major PCE products at our ￿ner level of aggregation, we supplement
it with data from Genesove (2003) on the degree of nominal rigidity in housing rents. Moreover, we use
evidence on medical care services in the Producer Price Index to re￿ne the estimate of price stickiness
in medical care implied by NS￿numbers. Finally, we adjust the CPI expenditure shares of the products
we consider to re￿ ect those in the PCE.
as observed by Woodford (2003).
5 In the New Keynesian model based on Calvo (1983) pricing, more ￿ exible prices result in a more volatile in￿ ation
rate, at least under plausible assumptions on the behavior of marginal cost (Bils and Klenow, 2004). In this respect, the
theoretical underpinning for core in￿ ation targeting just described could be interpeted as another variant of the informal
￿volatility￿argument we sketched above.
6 In the model we present, each sector produces one (composite) good. Therefore in what follows we use the words
sector, good and product interchangeably.
3As for labor shares, we compute them by applying the method proposed by Valentinyi and Herrendorf
(2008) to the major PCE products in our database. This method is particularly suitable to the task,
because it allows us to construct input shares for the components of ￿nal demand, such as consumption,
taking into account the input-output structure of the U.S. economy.
The second step of our analysis is the construction of a Cost-of-Nominal-Distortions Index (CONDI).
The CONDI is a T￿rnqvist (1936) price index￿ a weighted average of in￿ ation rates￿ that weighs
in￿ ation in di⁄erent goods as a function of the share of overall nominal distortions associated with the
production of each good. This is in contrast to a cost-of-living index (COLI), such as the PCE, which
weighs goods by their expenditure share. To quantify the contribution of each consumption sector to
overall distortions, we calibrate a multi-sector extension of the textbook New Keynesian model to the
evidence on sectoral heterogeneity discussed above. In this framework, we de￿ne the CONDI as the linear
combination of in￿ ation rates whose stabilization maximizes the welfare of the model￿ s representative
agent, as in Benigno (2004).
Finally, the third step of the analysis is to compare the performance of CONDI stabilization to
that of the unconstrained optimal policy, as well as to other, more familiar, approaches to monetary
policy. In particular, we focus our attention on two strict in￿ ation targeting strategies, the stabilization
of headline and of core PCE in￿ ation (i.e. PCE ex food and energy). This comparison provides a
quantitative theoretical underpinning for a discussion of the relative merits of monetary policies that
aim to stabilize di⁄erent types of in￿ ation.
Three main results emerge from our quantitative analysis. First, the optimal weights in the CONDI
depend largely on sectoral heterogeneity in price stickiness, and only marginally on variation in pref-
erences and technology, as re￿ ected by labor shares. This ￿nding con￿rms the robustness of the basic
principle that monetary policy should put more emphasis on the stabilization of in￿ ation in sectors with
more rigid prices. More speci￿cally, among non-core expenditures, the CONDI attributes almost no
weight to the very ￿ exible prices of energy goods and of food purchased for consumption at home, but
a large weight to ￿food away from home.￿At the same time, two categories that are part of core, but
whose prices are very ￿ exible, receive little weight in the CONDI: ￿motor vehicles￿and ￿clothing and
shoes.￿
Second, CONDI stabilization provides an excellent approximation to the unconstrained optimal
policy. In fact, the outcomes of the two policies are virtually indistinguishable in terms of welfare.
4Moreover, core PCE stabilization is a better policy than headline PCE stabilization, because core
in￿ ation on net readjusts the expenditure weights on sectoral in￿ ation rates in a direction similar to
that of the CONDI. In fact, the time series of CONDI in￿ ation, built with the optimal weights we
computed and the historical realization of sectoral prices, is highly correlated with core PCE in￿ ation
over the period from 1998 to 2006, but only moderately so with headline in￿ ation.
Nevertheless, core in￿ ation targeting is only a rough approximation of CONDI stabilization in terms
of welfare, our third key result. This approximation, however, can be improved through a simple
reclassi￿cation of major products across the core and non-core aggregates, which consists of moving
￿motor vehicles￿and ￿clothing and shoes￿to non-core and ￿food away from home￿to core. Interestingly,
this latter adjustment is slated to happen as part of the 2009 benchmark revision of the National Income
and Product Accounts. The welfare loss from a policy that stabilizes this ￿adjusted core PCE￿in￿ ation,
compared to the optimal policy, is equivalent to a permanent increase of annual in￿ ation in the optimal
equilibrium by 0.5 percentage points. In comparison, the in￿ ation equivalents (Jensen, 2002) of core
and total PCE stabilization are 0.8 and 1.3 percent respectively.
This paper is related to a large literature on the welfare costs of price distortions in New Keynesian
models, which includes the already cited work of Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004), as well as Erceg,
Henderson and Levin (2000), who consider the case of distortions in the goods and labor markets, and
Huang and Liu (2005), who focus on the presence of nominal rigidities in the production of intermediate
inputs.7 The key lesson of this literature is that in￿ ation stabilization is most important in the sectors
in which nominal rigidities are more pronounced, since these are the sectors with larger real distortions.
The contribution we add to this normative literature is the detailed quantitative dimension of our
analysis, which was made possible by the data collection work of Bils and Klenow (2004), Klenow and
Krytsov (2008) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008a).
This empirical work in turn spurred a rich literature on the positive evaluation of macroeconomic
models of price rigidity, started by Klenow and Krytsov (2008) and Golosov and Lucas (2007) and
now including work by Midrigan (2008), Burstein and Hellwig (2007), Gertler and Leahy (2008), and
Woodford (2008), as well as by Carvalho (2006) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008b) in a multi-sector
environment similar to ours. To our knowledge, none of this work includes a normative dimension,
7 See also Bodestein, Erceg and Guerrieri (2008), who study the optimal monetary policy response to a shock originating
in an energy sector with perfectly ￿ exible prices.
5which is instead the focus of this paper.8
The paper closest in spirit to ours is Mankiw and Reis (2003). These authors ask the same broad
question we address in this paper￿ what measure of in￿ ation should a central bank target?￿ and do so
in the context of a model of price setting with several dimensions of sectoral heterogeneity. However,
their approach to the answer is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from ours, in several respects. First, they consider
a model with sticky information, rather than sticky prices. Second, they adopt an ad hoc, and unusual,
objective for monetary policy. The central bank wants to minimize the volatility of real activity, with
no regard to that of in￿ ation. Third, their quantitative application is only meant to be suggestive,
since the centerpiece of the paper is a theoretical analysis of the e⁄ect of heterogeneity on the optimal
in￿ ation target in a two-sector version of their model.
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 describes our approach to the measurement of heterogeneity in
price stickiness and labor shares across PCE categories. Section 3 presents the multi-sector model with
time-dependent pricing on which we base our quantitative analysis and provides a formal de￿nition of
the CONDI. Section 4 discusses the CONDI weights we calculate under several calibrations of the model,
compares the performance of CONDI stabilization to that of headline and core in￿ ation targeting and
draws some implications of this comparison for monetary policy.
2 Measuring Heterogeneity Across PCE Categories
In this section, we present a dataset that includes measures of two important forms of heterogeneity in
the production and pricing of PCE goods. The ￿rst, and most commonly studied, is the frequency of
price adjustment, an indicator of di⁄erences in the degree of nominal rigidity across goods. The second
is the revenue share of labor, which we interpret as evidence of di⁄erences across sectors in production
technology and in the markups charged by ￿rms. We focus on these sources of heterogeneity, because
they give rise to an asymmetry across goods in the distortions stemming from nominal rigidity. In the
New Keynesian framework we adopt, these asymmetries might justify adjusting the weights of a CONDI
with respect to those of a COLI. The quanti￿cation of these adjustments is the main objective of this
paper.
8 But see Burstein and Hellwig (2008) for the normative implications of the presence of menu costs in a one-sector
model.
62.1 Price Stickiness
The empirical study of the price-setting process at the microeconomic level is one of the most active
areas of macroeconomic research of the last few years. Studies such as Bils and Klenow (2004), Klenow
and Krytsov (2008) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008a) for the United States and Dhyne et al. (2006)
for the Euro Area have contributed to the dissemination of a wealth of detailed evidence on the stickiness
of prices, especially for consumption goods. For the United States, the primary source of this evidence
is the CPI Research Database at the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which contains the product level price
data used to construct the CPI.
However, the main in￿ ation gauge for monetary policy in the Unites States is the PCE de￿ ator.
Therefore, this is also the price measure we use as the reference for our analysis, since the purpose of
the CONDI is to be an input for monetary policy decisions. As a result of this choice, we must convert
the available CPI-based evidence on price stickiness into measures that are de￿nitionally consistent with
the PCE de￿ ator. We use NS￿data as the basis for this conversion, because it is readily available and
focuses on a period (1998-2005) in which in￿ ation was low and stable.
NS report the average fraction of prices that change each month for 270 Entry Level Items (ELIs)
in the non-shelter component of the CPI, which covers about 70 percent of total expenditures.9 They
distinguish between changes in ￿actual￿and ￿regular￿prices. Actual price changes include changes due
to sales and changes due to substitutions of discontinued items with closely matching ones. Regular
price changes, on the contrary, only include changes in non-sale prices from one month to the next for
the same item. NS argue that sales and product substitutions are mainly driven by considerations other
than the desire of ￿rms to change their prices and thus result in far less macroeconomic price ￿ exibility
than regular price changes.10 For this reason, we focus here on the frequency of regular price changes,
with one exception.
We use the frequency of actual price changes for clothing and shoes (31 percent), because the median
frequency of regular price changes is a very low 3.5 percent. This implies an average life for the price
of an article of clothing of more than two years, which seems unreasonable given the high turnover in
apparel due to seasonal purchasing patterns and fashion changes discussed by Liegey (1994).
Another major PCE product for which we do not follow NS is medical care. A large fraction of
9 This ELI-level data is part of the supplementary material for the published version of NS, available at
http://www.columbia.edu/~en2198/papers/￿vefactsELITableSup1.xls. (URL last accessed: January 25th 2009)
10 For the impact of sales on monetary neutrality see in particular Kehoe and Midrigan (2008).
7medical care prices in the PCE do not refer to the out-of-pocket expenses covered by the CPI, but
rather to services consumed by individuals and paid by insurance companies. Therefore, the frequency
of price adjustment for the medical care ELIs reported by NS is probably not an accurate measure of
the degree of PCE price stickiness in this sector. Instead, anecdotal evidence suggests that the prices
for medical services result from bargaining between the insurers and the health providers, which usually
takes place once a year. This frequency of price adjustment is also consistent with the behavior of
the non seasonally adjusted producer prices for medical services. In light of these considerations, we
calibrate the average duration of PCE medical care prices to be a year, which implies that 8.3 percent
of these prices adjust on average every month.
Figure 1 summarizes the distribution of price stickiness across goods by way of expenditure weighted
CDFs. On the horizontal axis is the average fraction of prices that change in a month, from the stickiest
to the most ￿ exible. For each point on the CDFs, the vertical axis represents the fraction of expenditures
on goods whose prices adjust as or less frequently than the corresponding frequency on the horizontal
axis.
The price adjustment CDF for the ELI-level CPI data is labeled ￿CPI￿in the ￿gure. The frequency
of adjustment on the horizontal axis is for NS￿regular prices, except for the ELIs within clothing and
shoes and medical care. For the former we use posted prices, while for the latter we use our estimate of
8.3 percent. The weights are the expenditure shares for each ELI as reported by NS. They are re￿ ated to
sum to 100 percent of CPI expenditures. The resulting expenditure-weighted median monthly frequency
of price change is 10.6 percent.
We need to convert this evidence into measures of price stickiness for the ￿fteen major goods and
services in our PCE database. The conversion involves three steps.
First, we re￿ ate each of the ELI weights so that the sum of the weights of all the ELIs within a
particular PCE major product is equal to the average PCE expenditure share on that product over the
period 1998-2006.11 The resulting CDF is labeled ￿CPI - with PCE weights￿in Figure 1. The implied
median frequency of price change is 8.3 percent. This shift of the distribution towards less ￿ exible prices
is explained by the fact that some services, most notably medical services, receive less weight in the
CPI than in the PCE, due to the di⁄erence in scope between the two price indices. The prices of these
services tend to be stickier than the CPI median.
11 This re￿ ation requires a mapping from the CPI ELIs into the PCE major products, which are somewhat di⁄erent from
their equivalent in the CPI (McCully, Moyer, and Stewart, 2007). The details of the mapping we adopted are available
upon request.
8In the second step of the conversion, we fold into NS￿data evidence from Genesove (2003) on price
adjustment in housing services. Expenditures on housing services represent a very large fraction of total
expenditures in the United States: close to 30 percent in the CPI and about 15 percent in the PCE.
The only evidence on price stickiness for these services in NS is on ￿lodging away from home￿ , while
the bulk of housing expenditures in the PCE is on tenant and owner-occupied housing.12
Genesove (2003) estimates from the Annual Housing Survey that rents on 29 percent of apartments
do not change in a year.13 Assuming a constant probability of price adjustment in each month, this
number implies that each month the rent on 10.3 percent of rental units changes. We assume that
this estimate of nominal rigidity would hold also if owners rented out the dwellings they currently
occupy. Hence, we attribute a 10.3 percent monthly frequency of price change to tenant and owner-
occupied housing and readjust the weights of the other ELIs within housing to be consistent with its
PCE expenditure share.
The resulting CDF is labeled ￿PCE disaggregated￿in Figure 1. This CDF tracks the previous two
very closely for the stickiest half of expenditures, but the inclusion of the data on housing, whose price
￿ exibility is slightly higher than the weighted median, shifts it higher in its more ￿ exible half. The
resulting median frequency of price adjustment goes from 8.3 percent to 8.6 percent, but this small
change hides in part a shift of the right side of the distribution￿ with frequencies between 10 and 40
percent￿ towards stickier prices. This is a good illustration of the di¢ culty to capture the richness of
actual distributions of price stickiness with only one measure of central tendency.
Finally, in the third step of the conversion, we propose three levels of aggregation for the evidence
we have collected: (i) a baseline with one sector, (ii) a two-sector case, in which we separate core and
non-core items (i.e. food and energy) and (iii) a 15-sector case by major type of product. For each of
these three cases, we take the expenditure-weighted median of the frequency of price change within the
relevant category as its measure of price stickiness.
At the ￿nest level of aggregation, our dataset includes the thirteen ￿major types of product￿used
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in the PCE NIPA tables, plus a distinction between food at
home and away from home (rather than just food) and between electricity and gas and other household
12 Expenditures on owner-occupied housing are based on imputed owners￿equivalent rents.
13 Genesove (2003) uses AHS data over the period 1974-1981. This is a very di⁄erent sample than the 1998-2005 used
by NS and it covers a period of relatively high in￿ ation, which might lead to an overstatement of the frequency of price
adjustment in rents. However, this is by far the most reliable evidence on price stickiness of housing services we were able
to ￿nd.
9operations (rather than household operations alone).14 The reason for including these slightly ￿ner
distinctions is that the BEA categories we split are very heterogenous in terms of price ￿ exibility. The
prices of food away from home, for example, are among the stickiest, while food at home is at the other
hand of the ￿ exibility spectrum. Table 1 includes a complete list of the product categories included in
our dataset.
The CDF associated with our ￿nest level of aggregation is labeled ￿PCE 15-sector aggregates￿in
Figure 1. The aggregation using medians shifts the CDF further towards more sticky prices among the
relatively ￿ exible ones (i.e. to the right of the median). As a result, the median frequency of price
adjustment across the 15 aggregates is 9.0 percent.
The fourth column of Table 1 lists the resulting frequency of price adjustment for each of the
categories in the three levels of aggregation. For the one-sector baseline, we use the monthly frequency
of price adjustment obtained from the disaggregated PCE categories, 8.6 percent. Looking at the two-
sector case, we see that core prices adjust about two-thirds as frequently as non core prices. This
di⁄erential is largely due to the ￿ exibility of energy prices. In fact, food prices as a whole are about
as sticky as core prices, since the prices of food away from home, essentially a service, are among the
stickiest in the economy.
2.2 Revenue Share of Labor
The second form of heterogeneity across consumption goods we wish to measure is in the revenue share
of labor. To construct these shares, we need to match data on consumption goods, which are part of
￿nal demand, with data on factor inputs at the industry level. The problem is that there is no direct
mapping of industries into ￿nal goods.
In the literature, there are two main approaches to the solution of this problem. The ￿rst ap-
proach, followed for example by Hu⁄man and Wynne (1999) and Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia
(2008), is to use a reasonable grouping of industry data and de￿ne ￿nal goods, including consumption
goods, according to this grouping. This approach is not suitable for our purposes, because it results in
consumption goods that are not consistent with the product categories in the PCE.
The second approach, followed by Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008), uses inter-industry relation-
ships to reconstruct which industries produce the value added embodied in consumption goods. This
14 In NIPA Table 2.3.4 (Price Indexes for Personal Consumption Expenditures by Major Type of Product), for example,
we ￿nd a distinction between durable goods, nondurable goods, and services, as well as among thirteen more detailed
categories at the next level of disaggregation.
10approach allows to construct consumption-good-speci￿c aggregates that are consistent with the PCE
classi￿cations and that account for the whole structure of the U.S. supply chain. For this reason, this is
the methodology we follow here. This approach involves the manipulation of U.S. input-output tables
and of industry data on value added and factor costs. These manipulations are summarized in Appendix
A.1.
In our application, we focus on the major products in the PCE, rather than on the broader com-
ponents of ￿nal demand considered by Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008). Our data sources are the
input-output tables published in Chentrens (2007) and data on industry factor payments from Bureau
of Economic Analysis (2008). With these inputs, we calculate a time series of annual labor shares for
the PCE categories at our three levels of aggregation over the period 1998-2006. The resulting average
labor shares are reported in the ￿fth column of Table 1.
We ￿nd that the average revenue share of labor in total PCE is 70.3 percent, somewhat higher than
the 65 percent reported by Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008). Labor shares vary substantially across
consumption goods. Energy goods have the lowest labor share, 61 percent. At 83 percent, the labor
share of medical services is the highest among all 15 PCE categories. At ￿rst glance, the variation in
labor shares appears smaller than that in the frequencies of price changes. To study the implications
of these two kinds of heterogeneity for monetary policy, we incorporate them into our model, which we
present in the next section.
3 A Multi-Sector Model with Price Rigidities
In this section, we sketch a multi-sector generalization of the textbook New-Keynesian model, along
the lines of Benigno (2004) and Woodford (2003).15 The model economy is populated by a continuum
of worker-producers indexed by j 2 [0;1]. Each of these agents produces a single di⁄erentiated good
within a sector n = 1;:::;N, and consumes a composite of all goods. Each sector produces a composite
consumption good that we identify with one PCE major product in the data. The size of each sector is
determined by the fraction an of producers that belong to it, with
PN an = 1.
The production process di⁄ers across sectors in three dimensions. First, the frequency with which
producers are allowed to change their prices (1 ￿ ￿n), i.e. price stickiness, as in Benigno (2004). Second,





, i.e. the returns to labor. Third,
15Details on the model are available in an online appendix.
11the elasticity of demand faced by each producer (￿￿n), which determines their desired (or steady state)
markup. These last two parameters jointly determine the steady state revenue share of labor in each
sector. They are also important determinants of the welfare costs of price dispersion, given any level of
price stickiness. We introduce these two sources of sectoral heterogeneity to incorporate the evidence
on labor shares across consumption sectors presented above into our model.
There is a large literature on the positive implications of heterogeneity in nominal rigidities, espe-
cially on the transmission of monetary policy (see for example Carvalho, 2006; Nakamura and Steinsson,
2008b, Carvalho and Dam, 2008; Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia, 2009; as well as Carlstrom, Fuerst,
Ghironi and Hernandez, 2006; Imbs, Jondeau, and Pelgrin, 2007; and Sheedy, 2007). However, to our
knowledge we are the ￿rst to model di⁄erences in labor shares stemming from either technological or
demand factors in a New Keynesian framework, and to study their normative implications.16
3.1 Worker-Producers



























t + (1 ￿ ￿n)pt(j)yt(j) + Tt;
where B
j
t+1 is a portfolio of nominal assets with state contingent price Qt;t+1￿ the stochastic discount
factor. With complete markets, agents can insure against idiosyncratic shocks and thus all have the
same level of consumption, if their initial intertemporal budget constraint is the same. Therefore, we
drop the superscript j on consumption from now on.
Agent j 2 n produces a di⁄erentiated good yt(j) according to the production function
yt(j) = Zn;tht (j)
1
￿n
where Zn;t is a sector-speci￿c productivity process and ￿￿1
n ￿ 1 is the elasticity of output with respect to
changes in the labor input. This parameter is indexed by n; since it di⁄ers across sectors. It represents
16 Bouakez, Cardia and Ruge-Murcia (2008, 2009) estimate a very rich multi-sector model with heterogenity in price
stickiness and the returns to labor, but not in desired markups. They also focus exclusively on its positive implications.
12the ￿rst form of sectoral heterogeneity we introduce in our model. The productivity process is AR(1)
in logs
lnZn;t = ￿lnZn;t￿1 + ￿n;t;
with ￿n;t ￿ N(0;￿) a sector-speci￿c shock that is i:i:d. across sectors and time. Finally, ￿n denotes a
sector-speci￿c sales tax (or subsidy) and Tt lump-sum transfers from the government.17
3.1.1 Consumption Aggregates and Price Indexes



















and ct(j) is consumption of the good produced by entrepreneur j in sector n. The parameter ￿n governs
the elasticity of substitution among the continuum of varieties within the consumption aggregate that
de￿nes sector n. These aggregates are normalized so that, in steady state, an represents the share of
expenditures directed to the purchase of composite good n: We calibrate these shares to be consistent
with the evidence, although we do not focus on them in the normative analysis, since the economic
implications of this form of heterogeneity are not particularly interesting.


















where pt (j) is the price of good j:
17 We assume that the sector-speci￿c subsidy ￿n o⁄sets the gross markup charged by ￿rms in steady state, so that the
economy ￿ uctuates in a neighborhood of the e¢ cient equilibrium. This assumption signi￿cantly simpli￿es the derivation
of a second order approximation to the utility of the representative agent, which is the welfare criterion in our normative
analysis. See Woodford (2003) for details on this approach to optimal monetary policy analysis and Benigno and Woodford
(2005) for an alternative approach that does not rely on the e¢ ciency of the steady state.
133.2 First Order Conditions
3.2.1 Demand Functions and Market Clearing
The consumer￿ s intratemporal problem yields the following demand functions for each di⁄erentiated


























n;t denotes the relative price of sector n with respect to the overall price index.
From these formulas, we observe that ￿￿n is the elasticity of demand faced by each producer in
sector n: This is the second dimension of sectoral heterogeneity we incorporate in our model.
The market for each good clears, so that ct (j) = yt (j) 8j: We also de￿ne an output aggregate Yt;
with the same structure as the consumption one, so that Yt = Ct:
3.2.2 Aggregate Consumption












is the gross nominal interest rate paid on one period bonds and ￿t ￿ Pt=Pt￿1 is the gross in￿ ation rate
in the general price level.
3.2.3 Pricing
Each producer j 2 n faces a ￿xed per-period probability (1 ￿ ￿n) of re-setting her price. This probability,
which varies across sectors, is the third source of heterogeneity we model. When given the chance,
14producer j chooses a price pn;t to maximize utility, taking as given the demand function she faces and

























The second term in the square bracket is the disutility su⁄ered from producing a level of output yn;T.
This disutility is sector speci￿c, due to the di⁄erence in production function across sectors, although
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ￿ is common. We make this assumption because di⁄erences in this
elasticity would be hard to pin down empirically. Moreover, they have the same qualitative e⁄ect on the
dynamic behavior of the economy and on welfare as di⁄erences in ￿n; since the parameter that matters
for both is the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output ~ ￿n ￿ ￿n (1 + ￿) ￿ 1:




















Log-linearization of the ￿rst order conditions and of the aggregate price index described above yields











where hats denote log-deviations from steady state, ￿n;t ￿ logPn;t ￿ logPn;t￿1 is in￿ ation in sector n
and ￿t ￿ logPt ￿ logPt￿1 is aggregate in￿ ation. These equations include the Euler equation
^ Yt = ￿
￿
^ Rt ￿ Et￿t+1
￿
+ Et^ Yt+1;
and a set of Phillips curves for the determination of in￿ ation in each sector
(2) ￿n;t = ￿Et￿n;t+1 + kn
h￿























^ Zn;t ￿ ^ Zt
￿
15are the levels of output and the relative price that would prevail under ￿ exible prices and the slope is
kn ￿ ￿n
1 + ~ ￿n
1 + ￿n~ ￿n










and the de￿nition of the log-change in relative price
(3) ^ PR
n;t = ^ PR
n;t￿1 + ￿n;t ￿ ￿t.
We close the model with a description of monetary policy.
3.4 Monetary Policy
In the cashless economy with nominal rigidities presented above, monetary policy a⁄ects allocations by
choice of a state contingent path for the nominal interest rate. This choice can be modeled as a simple
feedback rule, in which the interest rate is set as a function of some endogenous variables, or as the
result of maximization of an objective function.18 This latter approach is at the center of the normative
part of this study, but we follow the former when calibrating the model, since a policy rule has the best
chance to provide a satisfactory empirical characterization of the observed behavior of monetary policy
in the United States.
However, we do not write the policy rule explicitly in terms of the interest rate, but rather implicitly,
as that rule that would result in a certain state contingent path of nominal income. In particular, we
assume that nominal income, Yt ￿ PtYt; which in our model is equal to consumption expenditures,
follows the unit root process
(4) ￿lnYt = ￿
Y
t ;
as in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008b), for example, where ￿
Y
t is i.i.d. with standard deviation ￿Y.
18 Svensson (2000) discusses in detail various approaches to the implementation of monetary policy in this class of
models.
163.4.1 The Policy Objective
The main objective of this paper is to compute a price index that minimizes the cost of nominal
distortions: a CONDI. The criterion we adopt for the evaluation of this cost is the unconditional








































n an (1 + ~ ￿n)
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^ PR



























This approximate loss function depends on the in￿ ation rate in each sector, on the deviations
of relative prices and of aggregate output from their ￿ exible price counterparts, as well as from the
cross-product of these two deviations. This latter term appears in the approximation because of the
heterogeneity in production functions across sectors, which is re￿ ected in ~ ￿n: If this parameter were
constant across sectors, the weighted log-deviations of relative prices from their steady state value
would be zero, both in the actual and in the ￿ exible price equilibrium, so that the cross term would
disappear. In this case, and with ￿n = ￿; we would recover an approximate loss function identical to
that in Benigno (2004).
Through its parameters, the loss function depends crucially on all the sources of heterogeneity in
the model. Focusing on the coe¢ cient on in￿ ation variability, which is the largest contributor to welfare
losses, we see that a more elastic demand (higher ￿n), a more concave production function (higher ￿n
and thus higher ~ ￿n) and a lower frequency of price adjustment, which results in a ￿ atter Phillips curve
(higher ￿n and thus lower ￿n), all amplify the losses from a given path of sectoral in￿ ation.
The period loss function in (5), together with the sectoral Phillips curves (2), highlights fairly clearly
the nature of the policy tradeo⁄facing the monetary authority. The ￿ exible price equilibrium is the ￿rst
best in this economy, given our assumption on the subsidy ￿n (see footnote 17). But this equilibrium
is not feasible when prices are sticky (Benigno, 2004). The reason is that the constraints on the ability
of ￿rms to adjust their prices prevent them from shadowing their ￿ exible counterparts, which move in
17response to productivity shocks. These movements in desired relative prices act as endogenous cost-push
shocks, which cannot be o⁄set by any choice of the unique instrument available to monetary policy.
As a result, actual movements in relative prices are ine¢ cient, leading to a misallocation of resources,
even if policy can stabilize aggregate in￿ ation and the output gap at the same time. Moreover, this
￿divine coincidence￿ between the two policy objectives of output and in￿ ation stabilization can be
achieved only in the case of symmetric price stickiness across sectors. In the more general case, in fact,
the optimal policy must tradeo⁄ all three objectives. As we will see, however, this optimal tradeo⁄
is closely approximated by a targeting rule that perfectly stabilizes an appropriate price index, the
CONDI. We now turn to its formal description.
3.4.2 The CONDI
At the center of our normative analysis is a class of strict targeting rules that perfectly stabilize a

















where the set of weights f￿￿
ngn is chosen to maximize W; under the constraints that embed the optimal
behavior of the private sector, equations (2) and (3). We also consider two alternative targeting rules,
headline PCE targeting and core PCE targeting. Headline PCE targeting is de￿ned by the standard
expenditure weights
￿PCE
n = an for n = 1;:::;N;






0 for n = 2 core
￿P
n02core an0
￿￿1 an for n 2 core
,
where the set of core goods includes all types of expenditures except for those on food and energy.
The comparison of the welfare implications of the targeting rules just described forms the basis for
our discussion of the relative merits of monetary policies that focus on the stabilization of core rather
18than headline in￿ ation. Of course, a strict in￿ ation target of any kind￿ headline, core, or CONDI￿
cannot be a practical recommendation for policy. Nevertheless, the comparison among targeting rules we
propose can provide useful indications on the type of in￿ ation index that central banks should monitor
most closely as a gauge of the distortionary e⁄ects of in￿ ation.
The reference point for the evaluation of the relative performance of our targeting rules is the
approximate unconstrained optimal policy. This is the solution to the linear-quadratic Ramsey problem
de￿ned by the welfare function W and by the constraints (2) and (3). Under our assumptions, this
solution provides a ￿rst order approximation of the optimal equilibrium, as well as a second-order
approximation of welfare under this equilibrium (Woodford, 2003).
As a metric for welfare comparisons, we follow Jensen (2002) and Dennis and S￿derstr￿m (2006) and
compute an ￿in￿ ation equivalent￿for each targeting rule. The in￿ ation equivalent for any suboptimal
policy is a simple monotonic transformation of the welfare di⁄erential between the optimal and the
suboptimal policy. As we show in Appendix A.3, it can be interpreted as the constant amount of
in￿ ation that would need to be added exogenously to the path of in￿ ation under the optimal policy to
make the representative agent indi⁄erent between this distorted equilibrium and the suboptimal one.
We adopt this particular measure of the distance between two policies, rather than a consumption
equivalent, for example, because it results in a direct comparison of the costs of stabilizing the wrong
kind of in￿ ation to those of stabilizing in￿ ation around the wrong level. The optimal level of in￿ ation
and the costs of deviating from it have been widely debated in the literature and among policymakers
at least since Friedman (1969) and thus they provide a useful benchmark for our discussion.19
3.5 Calibration
In this section, we use the evidence presented in Table 1 to discipline the choice of the model parameters
that govern the degree of sectoral heterogeneity. For the parameters without a cross-sectional dimension,
we use standard values to the extent possible. The calibration assumes that the PCE categories in
Table 1 correspond to the n = 1;:::;N consumption composites/sectors in the model and that time, t,
is measured in months.
19 See Kahn, King and Wolman (2003) for a comprehensive study of the e⁄ect of several frictions on the optimal level
of in￿ ation in a model with price stickiness. Billi (2008) is a recent treatment focused on the role of the zero bound on
nominal interest rates and includes detailed references, while Billi and Kahn (2008) contains a discussion of the related
policy debate in the United States. Fisher and Modigliani (1978) is a classic treatment of the costs of in￿ ation and their
sources.
193.5.1 Homogenous Parameters
Our choice of the parameters that are constant across sectors is guided by Carvalho (2006) and Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008b), who calibrate multi-sector models with price rigidity similar to ours. We set the
discount factor ￿ so that the steady state annual real interest rate is 4 percent and pick an inverse Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, ￿, equal to 0:5. This value is a compromise between the linear speci￿cation,
￿ = 0; adopted by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008b) and typical of the RBC literature (Hansen, 1985)
and the low elasticities of labor supply usually estimated by the empirical labor literature, which might
suggest values for ￿ around 2, as in one of the speci￿cations in Carvalho (2006).
We choose the parameters of the distribution of the productivity shocks, the standard deviation ￿ and
autocorrelation ￿; to replicate the standard deviation and autocorrelation of monthly PCE in￿ ation over
the period 1998 to 2006, which are equal to 0:20 and 0:19 percent respectively. This procedure implies
di⁄erent values for ￿ and ￿ across di⁄erent quantitative renditions of the model, depending for example
on the number of sectors considered and on the kinds of heterogeneity included in the speci￿cation.
This is because, as in any DSGE model, the mapping from the distribution of the primitive shocks to
the moments of the endogenous variables depends on the speci￿cation of the rest of the model.
For this moment matching exercise, we assume that monetary policy is conducted so that nominal
income Yt ￿ PtYt; which in the model is equal to consumption expenditures, follows the unit root process
(4), as in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008b). We calibrate the standard deviation of the innovation to this
process, ￿Y
t ; to match the standard deviation of the monthly growth rate of consumption expenditures
over the period 1998-2006, which is equal to 0:49 percent.
3.5.2 Heterogenous Parameters
The calibrated values for the parameters that are heterogenous across sectors are summarized in Table
1. The ￿rst, and least interesting, form of heterogeneity we must take into account is the size of each
sector. In the model, this size is governed by the parameters fangn ; which determine the steady state
share of total expenditures directed to each sector. We calibrate these parameters to match the average
expenditure shares of the relevant PCE categories over the period 1998-2006.
The second dimension of heterogeneity we calibrate is the frequency with which producers can adjust
their prices. In the time-dependent price setting model we consider, every month a fraction (1 ￿ ￿n) of
the goods that belong to composite n have their price adjusted. We match this fraction to the frequency
20of price change data listed in the fourth column of Table 1.
The last dimension of heterogeneity we calibrate is the revenue share of labor. In the model, the








This share depends on the elasticity of output to changes in the labor input, ￿￿1
n ; and on the inverse
of the gross desired markup of ￿rms in sector n; ￿n
￿n￿1; which in turn is a function of the elasticity of
demand faced by each ￿rm, ￿n: The data do not allow us to distinguish between variations in the labor
share due to di⁄erences in demand or in labor elasticities. For this reason, we present results for three
parametrizations, which are all consistent with the observed labor shares. The ￿rst parameterization,
which we denote by (I), attributes all the variation in labor shares to di⁄erences in demand elasticities,
￿n. The second parameterization (II) attributes all the variation in labor shares to di⁄erences in labor
elasticities, ￿n. The third parameterization (III) is the intermediate case in which half of the variation
in labor shares comes from ￿n and the other half from ￿n.
If the demand elasticity does not vary across goods, as in the one-sector baseline model and under
parameterization (II), we set ￿n = ￿ = 5; as in one of Carvalho￿ s (2006) speci￿cations, which implies
a steady state markup of 25%: This is very close to the average wholesale markup from the 1997
Census of Wholesale Trade among the industries that Bils and Klenow (2004) were able to match to
consumer goods in the CPI.20 A value of 5 for the elasticity of demand is intermediate between the
low elasticities￿ in the range of 3 to 4￿ typically found in the IO literature and used for example by
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008b) and Midrigan (2008), and the higher values more often adopted in the
macroeconomic literature￿ in the range between 7 and 10￿ based on the implications of these elasticities
for steady state markups (Woodford, 2003; Golosov and Lucas, 2007).
If the labor elasticity of output does not vary, as in the one-sector baseline model and under para-
meterization (I), we choose ￿n = ￿ = 0:88. Given the baseline elasticity of demand ￿ ￿ = 5, this is the
degree of decreasing returns to labor that is consistent with the average revenue share of labor in total
PCE of 70 percent we have measured over the period 1998 to 2006.
The three parametrizations corresponding to the observed heterogeneity in labor share are explained
in more detail in Appendix A.2. The resulting parameter values are listed in the last four columns of
20 We thank Mark Bils for providing us this matched dataset. The average markup in this dataset is 24%, which implies
an elasticity of demand of 5.1, while the weighted average markup (weigthed by CPI expenditure shares) is 20%, with an
implied elasticity of demand of 5.8.
21Table 1.
4 Results
In this section, we discuss the properties of the CONDIs implied by the calibrations discussed above. We
start from a two-good, two-sector version of the model, which distinguishes between core and non-core
goods. The simplicity of this speci￿cation highlights the qualitative relationship between the CONDI
weights and the parameters that are heterogenous across sectors and the economic intuition behind it.
We then move to an empirically more realistic 15-good version of the model, in which we can study in
more detail the allocation of CONDI weights within the core and non-core sectors, where a signi￿cant
amount of heterogeneity remains. Finally, we consider the practical implications of our results for
monetary policy.
4.1 The Two-Sector Model: Core and Non-Core
The results for the two-sector calibration of the model are reported in Table 2. For ease of reference,
the ￿rst group of columns reports the calibrated values of the parameters that change across sectors,
which we already discussed in the previous section.
The column labeled 1 reports the CONDI weights in the case in which the frequency of price
adjustment and the labor share in both sectors are set to their baseline homogenous values. These
weights are the same as the PCE expenditure weights: the CONDI and the COLI coincide. When the
two sectors are structurally identical, there is no reason to ￿twist￿the CONDI weights with respect
to the expenditure weights, because the distortions caused by nominal rigidities are the same across
sectors.
Moreover, in this case, PCE stabilization is a way of implementing the optimal policy, as con￿rmed
by the fact that its in￿ ation equivalent is zero. In fact, the sectoral Phillips curves can be aggregated
into an economy-wide Phillips curve with no tradeo⁄ between output gap stabilization and (headline)
in￿ ation stabilization. Blanchard and Gal￿￿ s (2007) ￿divine coincidence￿ holds under this particular
parameterization, as originally shown by Benigno (2004). However, equilibrium relative prices are not
equal to their e¢ cient ￿ exible counterparts even under this optimal policy, due to the constraints on
their movement imposed by price stickiness. As a result, welfare losses are positive, although as small
as possible.
22Stabilizing core in￿ ation is not a good policy in these circumstances, since it implies ignoring the
distortions in the non-core sector. When the two sectors share the same price stickiness, as well as all
other parameters, these distortions are just as large as those in the core sector, although the core sector
accounts for a much larger part of expenditures. As a result, the in￿ ation equivalent for this policy is
0.5 percent per month, a large loss compared to the optimum.
Column 2 considers the case in which sectors di⁄er only in the frequency of price adjustment.
According to our calculations, 11.8 percent of non-core prices change every month, as opposed to 8.3
percent in the core sector. Hence, core in￿ ation receives a weight of 89.9 percent in the CONDI,
compared to a PCE weight of 81.3 percent. As expected, the CONDI puts more emphasis on the
stabilization of in￿ ation in the stickier sector. However, the non core sector still receives a non-negligible
weight of 10.1 percent, given that its prices are far from perfectly ￿ exible. In terms of weights, then,
the CONDI is an almost perfect average of total and core PCE.
This result does not imply that headline and core targeting are equivalent policies in terms of welfare,
as we can observe from the last two rows of Column 2. Core targeting performs worse than headline
stabilization under this calibration. The two policies have in￿ ation equivalents of 0.51 and 0.36 percent
respectively. These numbers suggest that the mapping from the weights in the targeting criteria to their
welfare implications is not symmetric around the optimal weighting scheme: the losses increase more
steeply as we shift weight towards the core sector.
The other remarkable ￿nding in Column 2 is that the in￿ ation equivalent of CONDI stabilization is
virtually zero (0.005 percent per month). In fact, CONDI stabilization delivers similarly low in￿ ation
equivalents across all the calibrations we consider in Table 2. These calculations prove the robustness
of Benigno￿ s (2004) conclusion regarding the ability of a policy that stabilizes an optimally weighted
in￿ ation rate to approximate the optimal equilibrium very closely.
An important implication of the excellent welfare performance of CONDI stabilization in our econ-
omy is that the CONDI weights we have computed would change little if we embedded their optimal
choice in a more ￿ exible policy rule, such as an interest rate feedback rule. Even then, in fact, the
optimization would have to return something very similar to the strict CONDI targeting rule we have
assumed at the outset, and with the same CONDI weights, since there is very little room to improve
on this rule￿ s performance.
In columns 3 through 5 of Table 2 we consider three alternative calibrations of the model, in which
we allow the labor share to di⁄er across sectors, while keeping the degree of price stickiness at its baseline
23level. Column 3 corresponds to parameterization (I). This is the case in which heterogeneity in labor
shares is due exclusively to di⁄erences in markups and the curvature of the production function in all
sectors is 1=￿ = 0:88. Column 4 corresponds to case (II), where the heterogeneity in labor shares is
ascribed to di⁄erences in the labor elasticity of output, but markups are constant at ￿￿1
￿ = 1:25 across
all PCE categories. Column 5 considers the intermediate case (III) where half of the variance of log
labor shares is due to di⁄erences in markups and the other half to the labor elasticity of output.
When the elasticity of demand, and thus markups, di⁄er across sectors (Column 3), the CONDI
weights continue to be skewed in the direction of the core sector, although to a lesser extent than in
Column 2. The intuition for this result is that this calibration attributes the higher revenue share of
labor in the core sector to a lower markup, due to a higher demand elasticity. A more elastic demand
implies that a given degree of price dispersion translates into a higher degree of output dispersion across
individual producers. As a consequence, it is optimal to counteract price dispersion, and thus in￿ ation,
more strongly in the core sector, where the welfare costs of that dispersion are higher. Quantitatively,
this e⁄ect is not very strong. It leads to a more modest adjustment of the PCE weights than in the
case of heterogenous price stickiness (Column 2).
We ￿nd the opposite when the elasticity of labor in the production function is di⁄erent across sectors,
in a manner consistent with the observed heterogeneity in labor shares and with a constant markup of 25
percent (Column 4). In this case, the core sector receives a lower weight in the CONDI than in the PCE.
The reason is that the higher labor share now maps into a higher labor elasticity of output and thus into
less curvature of the production function. This curvature, in turn, determines the transmission of the
cross-sectional dispersion of output within the sector into the cross-sectional dispersion of hours, which,
in our model, is the main source of the welfare losses associated with in￿ ation and price dispersion. In
sum, a higher labor elasticity translates into less dispersion in hours, and thus lower welfare losses, for
any given level of in￿ ation. Therefore, the optimal weighting scheme suggests to pay less attention to
core in￿ ation, since the production function is less concave in labor in this sector.
In the intermediate case of heterogeneity in both markups and labor elasticities (Column 5), the
CONDI weights do not deviate much from the expenditure shares. This suggests that the countervailing
e⁄ects of these two forms of heterogeneity approximately cancel out, making headline PCE a good
approximation of CONDI.
In fact, the in￿ ation equivalent of PCE stabilization in Column 5 is only 0.02 percent per month.
More in general, PCE stabilization outperforms core stabilization by a wide margin in all the calibrations
24with heterogeneity in labor shares only. The reason is that the di⁄erences in labor shares in the data
are too small to result in signi￿cant deviations from the expenditure weights in the CONDI, as we just
saw. As a result, ignoring the non-core sector entirely, as under core targeting, amounts to ignoring
about one-￿fth of the allocative ine¢ ciencies caused by sticky prices in this economy, resulting in a large
welfare loss.
Next, we study the interaction between heterogeneity in price stickiness and in labor shares. Columns
6 through 8 of Table 2 again consider the three cases in which the labor shares re￿ ect di⁄erences only
in the elasticity of demand (Column 6), only in the returns to labor (Column 7), or in both (Column
8). The e⁄ects of these various kinds of heterogeneity on the CONDI weights cumulate in a fairly
straightforward way. In Column 6, the core sector has a CONDI weight of 92.2 percent since it has
both stickier prices and a more elastic demand. In Column 7, instead, the weight on core is down to
88.1 percent, since this sector has stickier prices, but a less concave production function. In Column 8,
the weight on core is 90.4 percent, which is very close to the 89.9 percent it should receive on account of
price stickiness alone (Column 2). This is because the e⁄ects of the calibrated degrees of heterogeneity
in demand and labor elasticities approximately cancel out, as in Column 5.
In terms of welfare, the results are consistent with those for the case with heterogeneity only in price
stickiness (Column 2). Headline PCE targeting continues to outperform core stabilization, except under
the calibration in Column 6, in which the two policies are roughly equivalent. The distance between
the two policies is equivalent to roughly 1.5 percent steady in￿ ation per year under parameterization
(III):
Comparison of the CONDI weights in the last three columns of Table 2 with those in Column
2 leads us to one important conclusion. The basic principle that core in￿ ation should be stabilized
more forcefully than non core in￿ ation is quantitatively robust to the inclusion of a degree of sectoral
heterogeneity in labor shares that is consistent with the data. This is particularly true in the case
represented in Column 8, which we consider the most realistic, since it admits that the measured
heterogeneity in labor shares might re￿ ect di⁄erences in both markups and the returns to labor in the
production function. However, the di⁄erences in the CONDI weights with respect to the case with only
heterogenous stickiness remain negligible overall even in the extreme cases considered in columns 6 and
7.
The two-good example presented in this section is a useful tool to develop some intuition for the
relationship between structural heterogeneity and the CONDI weights. However, accounting for the
25substantial heterogeneity in price stickiness and labor shares within the core and non-core sectors is
important for the construction of an empirically more accurate CONDI. We turn to this more detailed
construction in the next section.
4.2 The Fifteen-Sector Model
The CONDI weights for the 15-sector calibration of the model are reported in Table 3. Column 1 again
corresponds to the homogenous case in which stabilizing PCE in￿ ation is the optimal policy. Hence,
the CONDI weights in that Column correspond to the PCE shares listed in Table 1.
In Column 2, which refers to the case with only heterogeneous price stickiness, several entries stand
out. First, ￿gasoline, fuel oil and other energy goods￿ , with a frequency of price adjustment of 87.6
percent per month, receive no weight in the CONDI, as does the energy component of ￿household
operations￿ . ￿Food at home￿ , with a frequency of price adjustment of 12.3 percent, largely attributable
to fresh food, also shrinks from a weight of 8.5 percent to 3.8 percent. On the other hand, ￿food away
from home￿ , with a frequency of price adjustment of 5.0 percent per month, which is far lower than the
median, sees its CONDI weight in￿ ated to 14.1 percent, from its 5.2 percent PCE expenditure share.
Turning now to the weights on the core sectors, three categories stand out in terms of the deviation
of their CONDI weights from their expenditure shares. The ￿rst is ￿other services￿ , for which only 5.8
percent of the prices change each month.21 This is the PCE category with the stickiest prices and its
CONDI weight, at 28.0 percent, is double its expenditure share. This increase in the weight of other
services comes at the cost of that of two other core sectors: ￿motor vehicles￿and ￿clothing and shoes￿ .
Both of these categories receive less than a 0.5 percent weight in the CONDI because of their very
￿ exible prices. There is clearly enough heterogeneity in stickiness, and thus in CONDI weights, within
core and non-core products to justify a ￿ner level of disaggregation.
Under the calibration of Column 2, the sum of the CONDI weights on the four non-core sectors is
equal to 18.0 percent, close to their 18.7 percent expenditure share in the PCE. Perhaps surprisingly,
this does not imply that the stabilization of headline in￿ ation is a better policy than core in￿ ation
targeting, as demonstrated by the in￿ ation equivalents at the bottom of Column 2. Headline PCE
targeting produces welfare losses equivalent to a steady in￿ ation of 0.13 percent per month, or about
1.5 percent per year, while the in￿ ation equivalent of core targeting is less than 1 percent per year. The
21 Other services includes ￿nancial and legal services, education, clothing repairs and cleaning, and funeral services,
among others.
26reason is that headline stabilization weighs core and non-core correctly, but misallocates this weight
within each category, attributing too much weight to the very ￿ exible prices within non-core and too
little to the stickier prices within core, such as other services. As it turns out, this misallocation is more
severe than for core in￿ ation, which puts no weight on the very sticky food away from home, but too
much on the ￿ exible prices within core, such as motor vehicles and clothes.
When we move to calibrations with heterogenous labor shares, we recover similar qualitative patterns
to those identi￿ed in the corresponding two-sector model. Sectors with high labor shares, most notably
medical care, have larger CONDI than PCE weights when those labor shares are translated into low
markups (Column 3). On the contrary, the CONDI weights are smaller when large labor shares are
mapped into a higher labor elasticity (Column 4). The two e⁄ects approximately cancel out in the
intermediate case (Column 5), when we recover CONDI weights very similar to the expenditure shares
listed in Column 1. As a result, the calibration that includes all forms of heterogeneity (Column 8)
produces CONDI weights and welfare rankings very similar to those with heterogenous stickiness only
(Column 2).
Once again, we can conclude that the basic principle that the stability of in￿ ation in the goods with
stickier prices should feature more prominently in the objectives of central banks is quantitatively robust
to the presence of a realistic degree of dispersion in labor shares. However, a simple distinction between
core and non-core prices is not su¢ cient for the optimal implementation of this principle, since in practice
these two broad aggregates hide a fairly large amount of heterogeneity in price stickiness. In fact, core
in￿ ation targeting yields in￿ ation equivalent welfare losses of 0.8 percent per year, compared to losses
under CONDI stabilization that are virtually indistinguishable from those under the optimal policy.
Yet, core in￿ ation targeting represents a signi￿cant improvement over headline in￿ ation targeting, whose
in￿ ation equivalent is 1.3 percent per year.
We conclude this section with a comparison of realized CONDI with headline and core PCE in￿ ation







where the weights f￿￿
ngn are those from our preferred calibration with all forms of heterogeneity (Column
8 of Table 3). The sectoral in￿ ation rates f￿n;tgn are the historical realizations of the log-price changes
in the prices of the 15 PCE products in our database, as reported by the BEA.22
22 We exclude September and October 2001, in which the price index of other PCE services ￿ uctuated widely due to
27Figure 2 plots the annualized monthly in￿ ation rates in the three indexes￿ CONDI, headline and
core PCE￿ over the period January 1998 to December 2006. This time-series view con￿rms our welfare
analysis. CONDI and core in￿ ation behave quite similarly, while total PCE in￿ ation exhibits signi￿-
cantly more volatility. Over this sample period, the correlation of CONDI and core in￿ ation is 0.86,
while that with headline is only 0.50. In terms of volatility, total in￿ ation has the highest, with a
standard deviation of 2.3 percent, while CONDI was historically somewhat more volatile than core,
with standard deviations of 1.3 and 1.0 percent respectively.
This ranking of volatilities re￿ ects the emphasis of monetary policy in the United States on the
stabilization of core in￿ ation. But our welfare analysis suggests that there might be signi￿cant gains
from focusing instead on the stabilization of an in￿ ation index that takes into account more explicitly
the di⁄erences in price stickiness across di⁄erent consumption goods, such as the CONDI.
4.3 Implications for Monetary Policy
The key practical lesson we draw from the quantitative exploration we just discussed is that a mone-
tary policy that focuses on the stabilization of core in￿ ation represents an improvement over one that
targets headline in￿ ation. Under our preferred calibration of the 15-sector model, headline stabilization
produces welfare losses that are equivalent to an increase in average in￿ ation of 1.3 percentage points
per year, while the in￿ ation equivalent of core targeting is 0.8 percent per year.
Both these numbers are fairly large. By way of comparison, Kahn, King and Wolman (2003) ￿nd
that the steady state in￿ ation rate that optimally minimizes the costs of several monetary and price
distortions is -0.76 percent, or about 2 percentage points higher than Friedman￿ s (1969) recommendation
in their model. Dennis and S￿dertstr￿m (2006) and Jensen (2002) ￿nd welfare gains in moving from
discretion to commitment of the order of 1 percent in￿ ation per year, while Billi (2008) calculates that
the impact of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates can be minimized by increasing average
in￿ ation from zero to around 0.5 percent per year.23
Overall, these studies suggest that di⁄erences in average in￿ ation of around 1 percent per year across
policies are signi￿cant. Therefore, there is substantial scope for improvement in moving from core to
CONDI targeting, even if targeting core rather than headline in￿ ation already represents signi￿cant
progress. . The problem is that CONDI stabilization is not a viable recipe for policy making, for at
the accounting for the September 11th terrorist attacks.
23 See also Goodfriend, Mork, and S￿derstr￿m￿ s (2007) forceful endorsement of an in￿ ation target of 2 percent for Norges
Bank, rather than the current 2.5 percent.
28least two reasons. First, from a theoretical perspective, the exact speci￿cation of the CONDI is sensitive
to the details of one￿ s model. Second, from a policy perspective, such a construct would probably be
too complicated and obscure to be communicated e⁄ectively to the public.
Nevertheless, the CONDI we have computed can be used as a guide to the construction of an
adjusted core in￿ ation rate with the potential to achieve at least some of the available welfare gains.
The simple adjustment we propose entails reclassifying some PCE categories within the core versus
non-core framework. In particular, we would suggest moving ￿food away from home￿from non-core to
core and ￿motor vehicles￿and ￿clothing and shoes￿from core to non-core.
The ￿rst reclassi￿cation is actually scheduled to happen as part of the benchmark revisions of the
National Income and Product Accounts in August 2009 (McCully and Teensma, 2008). This move
appears very sensible from the perspective of our results, given the extreme price stickiness of ￿food
away from home￿ , which re￿ ects in part its high service content. As for motor vehicles, their prices
are extremely ￿ exible according to most available measures, partly due to variations in the costs of
￿nancing and the incentives o⁄ered by dealers over the model year and the business cycle. Therefore,
this reclassi￿cation for the purposes of monetary policy should also be fairly uncontroversial. Finally,
apparel prices are the category with the largest discrepancy in the frequency of ￿posted￿and ￿regular￿
price adjustments. Their posted prices change very often, due to seasonal sales and frequent product
substitutions (Liegey, 1994), while the regular prices computed by NS have an average life of more than
two years. We chose to measure the stickiness of this category with regular prices, whose ￿ exibility leads
us to recommend its exclusion from modi￿ed core. We would have reached the opposite conclusion if
we had adopted their regular frequency of price change instead.
As a result of our proposed reclassi￿cation, ￿adjusted core￿ PCE in￿ ation would be de￿ned as
covering total expenditures excluding autos, clothing, energy, and food at home. The implications of
this reclassi￿cation for welfare are illustrated in the last row of Table 3. The in￿ ation equivalent of
adjusted core targeting under our preferred calibration (Column 8) is below 0.5 percent per year. This
is a signi￿cant improvement over core in￿ ation targeting, whose in￿ ation equivalent is 0.8 percent per
year, and represents an equivalent reduction of about 1 percentage point in in￿ ation with respect to
headline in￿ ation targeting.
295 Conclusions
This paper studied quantitatively an optimally weighted price index whose stabilization minimizes the
welfare costs of nominal distortions: a Cost-of-Nominal-Distortions Index (CONDI). We computed the
weights on sectoral in￿ ation rates that de￿ne this index within a multi-sector New-Keynesian model with
time-dependent price setting, calibrated to U.S. evidence on the degree of heterogeneity in the frequency
of price adjustment and in labor shares across sectors. We focused on these two forms of heterogeneity
because they re￿ ect structural features of the sectors, such as price stickiness, the elasticity of demand
and the returns to labor, that justify altering the CONDI weights with respect to the expenditure
weights that de￿ne the usual PCE in￿ ation index.
The evidence for the model￿ s calibration is collected in a dataset whose ￿ner units of observation
are 15 ￿major types of product￿ within Personal Consumption Expenditures. We built this dataset
using as starting points Nakamura and Steinsson￿ s (2008a) data on the frequency of price adjustment
for the non-shelter component of the CPI and the input-output tables in Chentrens (2007), from which
we obtained labor shares for the PCE major products using the method of Valentinyi and Herrendorf
(2008).
We can summarize the results of our analysis as follows. First, the CONDI weights across the PCE
categories in our dataset mostly depend on price stickiness and are less a⁄ected by the other sources
of heterogeneity we consider. Second, CONDI stabilization closely approximates the optimal policy
and leads to negligible welfare losses. Third, targeting core is better than targeting headline in￿ ation,
because core in￿ ation on net readjusts the weights on sectoral in￿ ation rates in a direction similar to
that of the CONDI. Fourth, core targeting is only a very rough approximation of CONDI stabilization
in terms of welfare. However, the time series of core and realized CONDI in￿ ation are highly correlated
in U.S. data and their volatility is quite similar. Fifth, the approximation of the optimal policy provided
by core targeting can be improved substantially by a simple reclassi￿cation of major products from core
to non-core, and vice versa.
The calculations presented in this paper are only a preliminary step towards a comprehensive quan-
titative analysis of the welfare consequences of sectoral heterogeneity in nominal distortions. There are
at least three areas in which we need further progress. First, from a data perspective, we have the least
information on the rigidity of prices in the two most important PCE categories by expenditure share:
housing and medical care. In fact, this is not only a data collection issue. It is unclear what it means
30to be sticky for a notional price such as owner￿ s equivalent rent, or for a non allocative price such as
that paid by insurance companies for medical care.
Second, from a modelling perspective, we worked with the simplest New Keynesian speci￿cation,
with the minimal enrichments required to include heterogeneity in price stickiness and labor shares. In
particular, we adopted a Calvo pricing scheme that yields a simple and transparent approximation of
the utility of the representative agent. The main shortcoming of this choice is that the selection e⁄ect
that would be present in a menu cost version of this model might also mute the welfare costs of nominal
distortions (Golosov and Lucas, 2007; Burstein and Hellwig, 2008; and Midrigan, 2008). However, we
have no particular reason to believe that the selection e⁄ect would change the relative performance of
the targeting rules that we consider in our welfare analysis.
Third, in terms of calibration, we only considered two sources of sectoral heterogeneity: the frequency
of price adjustment and labor shares. In practice, sectors di⁄er along many more dimensions that might
be relevant for welfare, such as the volatility and persistence of shocks and the degree of nominal rigidity
in the markets on which ￿rms purchase their labor and intermediate inputs. The exploration of the
welfare consequences of these forms of heterogeneity is in our opinion an important avenue for future
research.
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37A Appendix
A.1 Calculation of Labor Shares
Let n be the number of consumption goods for which we have data. Let m be the number of com-
modities/sectors in the input-output tables. Let the use-matrix be given by U; whose (i,j)-th element
re￿ ects the fraction of gross output of commodity j used as intermediate input by the industry that
produces commodity i.24 Let y and v be column vectors, both of length m, with gross output and
value added of the industries that produce the commodities, both in current dollars. We can write the
resource constraint as
(8) y = U0￿ + v



















This allows us to de￿ne
(10) A = Unyn
￿1
such that the (j;i)-th element of A corresponds to the intermediate input share of input j in the
production of i. Then, we can write
(11) y = Ay + v =(1 ￿ A)
￿1 v
where (1 ￿ A)
￿1 is the domestic total requirements matrix. This allows us to calculate the total value
added requirements for production of each commodity.
Let l be a column vector with the compensation of employees in each of the sectors and let k be the
vector with factor payments, including pro￿ts, to factors other than labor. Then value added equals
the sum of the factor payments, such that
(12) v = l + k.
24 Throughout, we do not account for imports. That is, we consider a closed economy version of the input-output tables
and calculate domestic requirements.
38Finally, let the vector c, of length n, contain the amount of consumption of each of the consumption
goods in current dollars. Let the matrix B, of dimension n ￿ m, be the consumption ￿nal demand
matrix, where the (i,j)-th element re￿ ects the fraction of output of commodity j that ￿ ows towards
￿nal demand of consumption good i. Then
(13) c = By = B(1 ￿ A)
￿1 v = B(1 ￿ A)
￿1 l + B(1 ￿ A)
￿1 k = cl + ck,
where cl re￿ ects the part of consumption that can be accounted for by labor services, while ck is the
part of consumption that can be attributed to other factors.
The labor share in consumption good i can then be calculated as the ratio of the i-th element of cl
and the i-th element of c.
A.2 Calibration of Demand and Labor Elasticities
Let the set of parameters that attributes all of the di⁄erences in labor shares to disparities in demand







. Let the set of parameter values that attributes all the variation










































































































which is the sense in which this set of parameter values apportions the variation in labor shares equally
between demand and labor elasticities.
39A.3 The In￿ ation Equivalent
The objective is to compare welfare under any suboptimal equilibrium to that under the optimal policy.
Denote the time series for the endogenous variables under the candidate suboptimal equilibrium with


















































We de￿ne in￿ ation equivalent for equilibrium SO; ￿E
SO the amount of steady in￿ ation that would need
to be exogenously added to the path of in￿ ation in each sector under the optimal equilibrium to make
the representative agent indi⁄erent between this ￿distorted￿optimal equilibrium and the suboptimal
one. ￿E

































































= LSO ￿ LO
where the last line uses the fact that E￿O













n + ~ ￿n
￿ (LSO ￿ LO);
a simple monotonic transformation of the loss di⁄erential between the suboptimal and optimal equilibria:
40Figure 1: Expenditure weighted cumulative density functions of price stickiness for four steps of data
conversion. CPI corresponds to the ELI-level CPI data in NS, with their expenditure weights. CPI
with PCE weights adjusts those weights to sum to the expenditure shares of the corresponding PCE 15
major products. PCE disaggregated includes in this our supplementary sources on housing and medical
care. PCE 15-sector aggregates corresponds to the weighted medians of PCE disaggregated within each
major product.
41Figure 2: Time series of realized CONDI in￿ ation, compared to headline and core PCE. We build
realized CONDI in￿ ation as the weighted average of actual in￿ ation rates for the 15 sectors at our ￿nest
level of disaggregation, using as weights those reported in Column 8 of Table 3.
























PCE 100% 8.6% 70.3% 5.0 0.88 5.0 0.88
(ii) Two Sectors
Core ￿ 81.3% 8.3% 72.8% 5.8 0.91 5.4 0.89
Non-core 18.7% 11.8% 66.1% 4.0 0.83 4.4 0.85
(iii) Fifteen Sectors
Motor vehicles ￿ 5.5% 31.3% 72.2% 5.6 0.90 5.3 0.89
Furniture and household equipment ￿ 4.5% 6.0% 70.3% 5.0 0.88 5.0 0.88
Other durables ￿ 2.4% 6.4% 69.8% 4.8 0.87 4.9 0.88
Food at home 8.5% 12.3% 66.8% 4.1 0.83 4.5 0.86
Food away from home 5.2% 5.0% 70.4% 5.0 0.88 5.0 0.88
Clothing and shoes ￿ 4.2% 31.0% 69.3% 4.7 0.87 4.8 0.87
Gasoline, fuel oil and other energy goods 2.8% 87.6% 61.4% 3.3 0.77 4.0 0.82
Other non-durables ￿ 7.9% 9.4% 68.4% 4.5 0.85 4.7 0.87
Housing ￿ 15.1% 10.3% 69.9% 4.9 0.87 4.9 0.88
Household operations - Other ￿ 3.5% 10.7% 72.0% 5.5 0.90 5.2 0.89
Household operations - Electricity and Gas 2.2% 38.1% 51.6% 2.4 0.65 3.2 0.75
Transportation ￿ 4.0% 8.2% 71.7% 5.4 0.90 5.2 0.89
Medical Care ￿ 16.3% 8.3% 83.2% 18.5 1.00 7.7 0.94
Recreation ￿ 4.1% 9.0% 76.5% 7.7 0.96 6.0 0.92
Other services ￿ 13.9% 5.8% 76.4% 7.6 0.96 6.0 0.92
Homogenous Parameters
￿ ￿ ￿ s.t. ￿ s.t. ￿Y
(0:96)1=12 0:5 Corr(￿t;￿t￿1) = 0:19 StDev(￿t) = 0:2% 0:49%
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